Policy profiles

Summary

A policy matches connection metadata and attaches reusable profiles. Profiles change processing after the policy decision; they do not change which policy matches. Keep profiles narrow and name them by behavior, not by environment.

Policy-to-profile flow

connection
  → first matching policy
      → action / NAT / routing
      → TLS profile
      → detection profile
      → content profile
      → DNS ALG profile
      → feature list

A missing or unknown referenced profile is reported during configuration load. Check events after every reload.

TLS profiles

Minimal interception profile:

tls_profiles = {
    inspect_strict = {
        inspect = TRUE;
        allow_untrusted_issuers = FALSE;
        allow_invalid_certs = FALSE;
        allow_self_signed = FALSE;
        ct_enable = TRUE;
        sslkeylog = FALSE;
    };
};

Important behavior groups:

Group Fields
Interception inspect, no_fallback_bypass
Upstream validation allow_untrusted_issuers, allow_invalid_certs, allow_self_signed
Browser warning/override failed_certcheck_replacement, failed_certcheck_override, timeout and timeout type
Key exchange/reuse use_pfs, left_use_pfs, right_use_pfs, left_disable_reuse, right_disable_reuse
Revocation ocsp_mode, ocsp_stapling, ocsp_stapling_mode
CT and ALPN ct_enable, alpn_block
Custom certificates SNI/IP lookup switches and searched-only mode
SNI bypass bypass list plus DNS-cache/domain-tree lookup switches
Observability sslkeylog, TLS-alert suppression controls

ocsp_mode values are 0 disabled, 1 end certificate and 2 full chain. Stapling mode is independent: loose, strict or required according to the selected value in the running schema.

Allowing invalid, self-signed or untrusted upstream certificates weakens the proxy's verification role. Use a dedicated policy/profile for a specific target rather than changing the default profile.

Content profiles

content_profiles = {
    metadata_only = {
        write_payload = FALSE;
        ja4_tls_ch = TRUE;
        ja4_tls_sh = TRUE;
        ja4_http = TRUE;
        webhook_enable = FALSE;
    };
};

Content profiles control:

  • capture enablement, format and per-direction limits;
  • JA4/JA4S/JA4H collection;
  • synchronous content webhooks;
  • regex-based content replacement rules;
  • optional session filtering for rules.

Content rules contain match, replace, optional fill_length and optional replace_each_nth. They operate on proxied application buffers, not a reconstructed full file. Regexes can cross neither arbitrary buffer boundaries nor protocol encryption that was not intercepted. Test rules with fragmented input.

webhook_lock_traffic serializes synchronous content processing and can amplify receiver latency. Leave it off unless ordering requirements justify the throughput impact.

Detection profiles

Detection profiles select whether signature and application engines run for the connection. Current schema exposes mode, engine enablement and knowledge-base enablement. Supported mode values and their exact read/peek timing are build-specific; use CLI completion and shipped defaults rather than importing numeric values from historical documentation.

Diagnostics:

diag sig list
diag proxy session list 7
execute kb print

DNS ALG profiles

DNS profiles have three runtime controls:

Field Meaning
match_request_id require response transaction ID to match a request
randomize_id replace the transaction ID on the upstream query
cached_responses allow responses from the DNS cache

See DNS and DoH for packet flow and cache diagnostics.

Features

Policy feature tags add behaviors such as traffic sinks, statistics emission and external access requests. Sink features consume one or both directions after capture writers have had an opportunity to record traffic. An access-request feature depends on the webhook receiver and currently fails open on an unusable response; see Webhook payload reference.

Review checklist

For each policy, answer explicitly:

  1. Is TLS intercepted or bypassed?
  2. Which upstream validation exceptions apply?
  3. Is payload written or sent externally?
  4. Which fingerprints and engines run?
  5. Can an external webhook block, replace or authorize traffic?
  6. Does routing change address, port or SNI?

If the answer cannot be derived from show config plus the named profile, the configuration is too indirect for reliable operation.